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NOTES
Employment Discrimination-Hart v. J T Baker Chemical Co.:
Third Circuit Declares Time Limit to File Discrimination
Charge with EEOC Nonjurisdictional
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' requires an aggrieved
party to file a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within a specified period of time.2 The statute is silent, however, on the nature of this time3
limitation, and courts disagree on the effect of a failure to comply.
While some courts treat the Title VII filing period as a jurisdictional
prerequisite, others treat it as a statute of limitations. The significance
of this distinction lies in the availability of equitable relief in cases of
late filing. If the time limit is held to be jurisdictional, untimely filing is
an absolute bar to the maintenance of a suit notwithstanding equitable
considerations such as tolling for fraudulent concealment.4 If the time
limit is analogous to a statute of limitations, however, a claimant can
invoke equitable doctrines to excuse the failure to comply.' In Hart v.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
2. Id § 2000e-5(e) provides:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge. . . shall be
served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter,
except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency. . . . such
charge shall be filed. . . within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local
agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier....
As originally enacted, the filing deadline was 90 days unless procedures were commenced under
state or local law, in which case the deadline was 210 days after the discriminatory act or 30 days
after receiving notice of termination of state proceedings, whichever was earlier. Pub. L. No. 88352, 78 Stat. 241, § 706(d) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970)). The current version was enacted as part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103, § 706(e) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976)).
In addition to the deadline for filing charges with the EEOC, there is a 60-day waiting period
before a charge can be filed with the EEOC if prior resort to a state remedy is required under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
3. See notes 67-77 and accompanying text infra.
4. 'The parties cannot waive lack ofjurisdiction, whether by express consent, or by conduct,
nor yet even by estoppel." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (3d ed.
1976); see Jackson & Matheson, The Continuing Violation Theory and the Concept ofJurisdictionin
Title VII Suits, 67 GEO. L.J. 811, 842, 844 n.179 (1979).
5. See Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1978).
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JT Baker Chemical Co.,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that timely filing with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in district court.7 Although this decision
adds to the growing weight of authority holding the filing requirement
to be nonjurisdictional,' the circuits remain split on this issue. 9
In Hart, plaintiff was discharged from her employment as a biochemist on July 29, 1973.10 She did not file a formal charge with the
EEOC, however, until November 17, 1974, which was 477 days after
her discharge." Although this filing was untimely, plaintiff alleged
that she was unaware of the possible discriminatory motive for her discharge until December 1973, when a state employment counselor informed her of a discriminatory remark made by her former
supervisor.' 2 On September 22, 1974, within 300 days of discovering
this remark, plaintiff sent a letter to the EEOC raising the possibility of
a sex-related discharge. 13 This letter informed the EEOC that defendant had not discharged a male biochemist in the same department de14
spite the supervisor's constant complaints about the male employee.
Plaintiff's letter of September 22, 1974, however, did not mention the
allegedly discriminatory remark,'" and this omission was repeated in
the formal charge filed with the EEOC on November 17, 1974.16
Upon receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, 17 plaintiff
fied a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
6. 598 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1979).
7. Id. at 833.
8. See text accompanying notes 68, 69 & 77 infra.

9. See text accompanying notes 67-77 infra.
10. 598 F.2d at 830.
11. Id. at 830, 834.

12. Id. at 830 & n.3. Plaintiff's former supervisor allegedly told an employment counselor
that plaintiff was "bowled over by aggressive men at the working level." Id. at 830 n.3.

13. Id. at 830, 833-34. Plaintiff argued that this letter constituted the filing of a charge, Id. at
831, even though she subsequently filed a formal charge on November 17, 1974. d. at 830. In
holding that the extended 300-day time period did not apply because plaintiff failed to file initially
with a state agency, the court used November 17, 1974 as the filing date. Id. at 834. The court
also stated, however, that the 300-day period would result in a timely filing if the time limit were
tolled until December 1973, when plaintiff became aware of the allegedly discriminatory remark.

Id. In fact, use of the 300-day time period in conjunction with the December 1973 tolling date
would still have required filing by the end of October 1974. Therefore, the court seemed to imply
that the letter of September 22, 1974, which it characterized as advisory, 1d. at 833, would have
sufficed as a timely filing of a charge. On the other hand, this may have been a clerical or mathematical error.
14. Id. at 833-34.
15. Id. at 834.
16. Id.
17. Title VII imposes a 90-day time limit for commencement of civil action after the EEOC
has given notice of the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(l) (1976).
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New Jersey, alleging violation of Title VII.'8 Refusing to toll the filing
period, the district court granted summary judgment for defendant,19 and plaintiff appealed. In affirming the judgment of the district
court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held

that, although tolling will be allowed in appropriate circumstances, the
district court did not err in refusing to toll on the basis of the Hart
facts.2 0 The court affirmed the denial of tolling in Hart because plain-

tiff's charge was based on information within her knowledge at the
time of her discharge, rather than on the subsequently discovered re-

mark. 21 This distinction indicates that late discovery of the allegedly
discriminatory remark was irrelevant and that plaintiff's suspicions at

the time of her discharge would have put a reasonable person on inquiry notice.22 The court of appeals also agreed with the district court
to defendant, who did not
that tolling on these facts might be unfair
23
delay.
the
to
contributed
have
to
appear

In holding that tolling was permissible in certain circumstances,
the court stated that remedial legislation should be liberally construed
in order to fulfill its congressional purposes.24 Because the purpose of
Title VII is the elimination of employment discrimination,2 5 the court

reasoned, the statute should be interpreted in a "humane and commonsensical manner."2 6 In addition, the court noted that it should be
18. 598 F.2d at 830.
19. Id. at 830-31. The district court denied defendant's prediscovery motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Following discovery, defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on plaintiff's claims for refusal to rehire and unfavorable references, but was
denied on the discriminatory discharge claim. On reconsideration, however, summary judgment
was granted on this remaining claim because the court, although finding that the filing requirement might be subject to tolling under certain circumstances, held that the facts of Hart did not
warrant such equitable relief. Inexplicably, the district court went on to hold that plaintiffs untimely filing deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
20. Id. at 833.
21. Id. at 834.
22. Id. The court thereby established a standard of diligence for tolling in Title VII cases
whereby tolling will be denied if a plaintiffs suspicions would have put a reasonable person on
inquiry notice. The Fifth Circuit applies a similar test in delaying the commencement of the filing
period "until the claimant knew or should have known the facts which would give rise to his Title
VII claim." Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, at 848-50.
23. 598 F.2d at 834.
24. Id. at 831.
25. Id. at 831-32 (citing H.R. REP.No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprintedin [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2401).
26. Id. at 831. The court reasoned by analogy to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), which, as remedial legislation, is entitled to liberal construction. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1977) (ADEA's 180-day
filing period not jurisdictional). In addition, the court acknowledged its prior holding in Holliday
v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978), that ADEA procedure
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flexible in considering procedural errors because the remedial scheme

assumes filing by laymen. z7 The court also noted the harsh results of
treating the filing requirement as jurisdictional and, therefore, concluded that it was not jurisdictional.2 8 In so holding, the court rejected
defendant's contention that Electrical Workers Local 790 . Robbins &
Myers, Inc. 9 and other United States Supreme Court cases require a

determination that the filing requirement is jurisdictional.3 °
Defendant's contention that the Supreme Court had already de-

cided this jurisdictional debate presents one of the main reasons for the
disagreement among the circuit courts concerning the nature of the Title VII filing requirement. Specifically, courts disagree whether the
Supreme Court decisions in Electrical Workers, Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 3 I and nitedAir Lines, Inc. v. Evans32 are controlling on
the nature of the EEOC filing deadline. 33 In Electrical Workers, comshould not be interpreted by analogy to Title VII. The court in Hart insisted, however, that it was
merely relying on the similar substantive policies of Title VII and ADEA, rather than reasoning
by analogy to procedural provisions. But cf Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 99 S.Ct. 2066 (1979)
(prior resort requirements of ADEA similar to and patterned after Title VII).
Although Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), af'dby an equa/4' divided
court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam), permitted tolling of the ADEA time limit and is often cited
by analogy in Title VII cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted
that Dartt's affirmance by an equally divided Court reduces its precedential value. Smith v.
American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978).
27. 598 F.2d at 832. The court cited Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972) (no new
charge from complainant required for EEOC to begin investigation when EEOC referred complainant's original charge to state agency and formally filed it when state agency declined to act).
Concerning the flexible interpretation of laymen's deadlines, the Love Court stated:
The respondent makes no showing of prejudice to its interests. To require a second
"filing" by the aggrieved party after termination of state proceedings would serve no
purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural technicality. Such technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by
trained lawyers, initiate the process.
Id.at 526-27 (footnote omitted).
28. 598 F.2d at 832-33.
29. 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
30. 598 F.2d at 832. See generally text accompanying notes 31-66 lfra.
The court held that ElectricalWorkers and other Supreme Court cases were not controlling
for four reasons: (1)the rationale of the Supreme Court decisions is unclear; (2) 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976) grants jurisdiction of Title VII actions to federal courts, but does not deny
jurisdiction for late filing; (3) the term "jurisdictional prerequisite" has "crept into Title VII jurisprudence" without explanation or guidance on its applicability and is mere dictum, despite its
subsequent use as a basis for Supreme Court holdings; (4) the Court in Electrical Workers left
tolling an open question as evidenced by its comparison of the facts of that case to those in Burnett
v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424,429 (1965), an improper venue case. See Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1978).
31. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (decision of arbitrator under contractual grievance procedure not controlling in Title VII action).
32. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
33. See text accompanying notes 60-66 infra.
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plainant filed her charge with the EEOC 108 days after her discharge,
but only eighty-four days after termination of contractual grievance
proceedings. 4 Because she failed to file within the ninety-day limit imposed by Title VII prior to the 1972 amendments,3 5 the district court

dismissed the complaint and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.3 6 The Supreme Court reversed,

holding that the longer 180-day time limit of the 1972 amendments applied to the case because the discriminatory act occurred within 180
days of enactment of the amendments, thereby resulting in a timely

filing.3 7 In dictum, the Court engaged in a detailed discussion of plain-

tiff's contention that the Title VII filing requirement should be tolled
during contractual grievance proceedings. 3 8 Although the Court ulti-

mately held that tolling pending contractual proceedings is not permitted,39 it never stated that the statute absolutely prohibits tolling.4"
In denying tolling, the Electrical Workers Court relied on several

factors,41 some of which imply that the filing period is jurisdictional,
and some of which imply that it is a statute of limitations. For example, the Court emphasized that defendant lacked notice of the Title VII

charge 42 and stated that the Title VII limitation period was intended to
assure "prompt notification to the employer."4 3 These factors indicate
34. 429 U.S. at 232.
35. See note 2 supra.
36. Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 525 F.2d 124 (6th Cir. 1975).
37. 429 U.S. at 241.
38. Id. at 236.
39. Id. at 244.
40. The Court in Electrical Workers gave the following seven reasons for denying tolling
pending contractual proceedings: (1)Title VII actions and contractual proceedings involve independent claims and remedies; (2) the policy of protecting the defendant is not outweighed by
the interests of justice as was the case in Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965),
because plaintiff in Electrical Workers was not prevented from asserting her rights, and also did
not assert the identical claim in a different forum, thereby giving notice to defendant; (3) the
policy of favoring arbitration does not require tolling the Title VII time limit, just as it does not
require an arbitration decision to be followed in a Title VII suit as the Court held in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); (4) the danger of conflict in the simultaneous pursuit of
remedies does not require tolling because they are separate and independent remedies as was the
case in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); (5) courts are not at liberty
to excuse a "slight" delay because Congress has specified what delay is acceptable and has defined
'Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisites 'with precision' "; (6) by allowing a single, strictly limited
extension of time in which to assert a discrimination claim under state law, the logic of negative
implication indicates Congress' unwillingness to toll the Title VII time limit pending contractual
proceedings; and (7) use of a contractual grievance procedure does not provide prompt notice to
defendant of a Title VII charge because it is a different claim, with different issues and standards.
Id. at 236-40.
41. See note 40 supra.
42. See id
43. 429 U.S. at 240 n.14. In addition, the Court relied heavily on Johnson v. Railway Ex-
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that the filing period is similar to a statute of limitations because equitable considerations of notice and prejudice are irrelevant to a jurisdictional limitation. The Court further suggested that the filing period is
similar to a statute of limitations by its reliance on cases in which the
running of a limitations period was held not to bar the retroactive application of new legislation to justify its application of the "extended
limitation period" of the 1972 amendments. 4 Other considerations relied on by the Court in reaching its decision not to toll indicate, however, that the filing period is jurisdictional.4 5 For example, the Court
relied on its earlier dictum in Alexander that Title VII "'specifies with
precision the jurisdictionalprerequisitesthat an individual must satisfy
before he is entitled to institute a lawsuit.' "46
This dictum in Alexander stems from dicta in earlier circuit and
Supreme Court cases. In Beverly v. Lone StarLead Construction Co. 47

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated, in dictum, that the only jurisdictional prerequisites for a Title VII suit are
filing a complaint with the EEOC and receipt of a notice of the right to
sue. 48 Without explanation, the Supreme Court, in dictum in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,4 9 added timeliness to the Fifth Circuit's

paradigm of jurisdictional prerequisites.5 0 The Supreme Court repeated its McDonnell Douglas dictum in Alexander,5' and further repeated its Alexander dictum in Electrical Workers.5
press Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), in which the Court refused to toll the state statute of
limitations for an action brought under § 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976), because the complainant's prior filing with the EEOC on an independent claim did not
give the defendant adequate notice of the claim under § 1981. 421 U.S. at 467 & n.14. The Johnson Court noted that only a timely prior filing of the same cause of action provides the defendant
with notice and thereby fulfills the function of the statute of limitations. d.
44. 429 U.S. at 243-44 (citing Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1944);
William Danzer Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R., 268 U.S. 633 (1925)).
45. Id. at 240.
46. Id. (quoting 415 U.S. at 47) (emphasis added).
47. 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971) (EEOC finding of "no reasonable cause" does not prohibit
assertion of district court jurisdiction).
48. Id. at 1140. The court did not make timeliness a jurisdictional prerequisite, but did cite
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968), in which the court considered
timeliness to be jurisdictional.
49. 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (EEOC finding of reasonable cause not a prerequisite to court action).
50. Id. at 798. The Court stated that "[riespondent satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to
a federal action (i) by filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the Commission
and (ii) by receiving and acting upon the Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue." Id.;
accord, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
51. 415 U.S. at 47.
52. 429 U.S. at 240. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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UnitedAir Lines, Inc. v. Evans5 3 is a further step in the Supreme
Court's multiplication of its own dicta. The Evans Court cited Alexander and ElectricalWorkers in stating that "[t]imely filing is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action."54 Although the Evans
Court briefly discussed the time limit as an issue of jurisdiction,5 5 it
also referred to untimely claims as being "barred by limitations."5 6 In
Evans, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois had dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds. The
Supreme Court, however, did not affirm the dismissal on the express
basis of lack of jurisdiction; it merely held that the action was "properly
dismissed"57 and stated that the failure to allege a continuing violation
made the complaint "ripe for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)."'5 8 The
Court also stated that, without timely filing, a discriminatory act is as
legally ineffective as if it had occurred before the statute was passed. 9
The circuits disagree on whether these Supreme Court cases are
definitive statements on the nature of the EEOC filing deadline. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has concluded
that Electrical Workers is not controlling because it dealt with tolling in
a particular circumstance instead of completely rejecting its possible
use.60 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth
Circuits have reached the same conclusion, reasoning that, because
Electrical Workers distinguished a plaintiff who voluntarily pursued an
alternative contractual remedy from one who was prevented from asserting his rights, the door was left open for tolling in the latter circumstance.6 ' The Second Circuit also has concluded, without specifying
any particular reason, that the Supreme Court's reference to "jurisdictional prerequisites" in Alexander and McDonnell Douglas is not controlling.62 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
53. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
54. Id. at 555 n.4.
55. Id. at 557 n.9. The Court stated that the plaintiff "cannot rely for jurisdiction on the

single act of failing to assign her seniority credit for her prior service at the time she was rehired,"
because she waited more than a year after being rehired to file with the EEOC.
56. Id. at 560.
57. Id. at 557.
58. Id. at 556 n.8.
59. Id. at 558. This might imply that the filing requirement is jurisdictional because it limits
the "temporal reach" of the court. It might, however, be similar to a statute of limitations because
of the emphasis on the defendant's repose. See note 127 infra.
60. Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied,99 S. Ct. 87

(1978).
61. Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1979); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1978).
62. Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1978).
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however, considers the references persuasive but not determinative. 3
Although the Fifth Circuit has since reversed its position,64 in McArthur
v. Southern Airways, Inc.6 5 it specifically held Evans to be controlling
on the nature of the filing deadline on the ground that Evans reinstated
the district court's jurisdictional dismissal and treated a discriminatory
act without timely filing as legally ineffective.66
Not only do the circuits disagree on whether the Supreme Court's
language is controlling, they also disagree on the nature of the Title VII
filing period.6 7 At the time the Third Circuit decided Hart, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was the
only circuit court holding the time limit to be nonjurisdictional. 68
Since the Hart decision, however, the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have also held that it is subject to equitable modification. 9 On the other hand, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have adopted the view
that the filing requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite, 0 while the
63. In re Consolidated Pretrial Procecdings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1151 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. granted,99 S.Ct. 2834 (1979). In discussing the Supreme Court's reference to the
time period as a "jurisdictional prerequisite," id., the Seventh Circuit cited a footnote in Evans
that did not use the word 'jurisdictional." See text accompanying note 54 supra.
64. See Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979).
65. 569 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
66. Id. at 277. But see notes 69, 152-56 and accompanying text infra.
67. Confusion and disagreement on this issue began as far back as 1968. Compare Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 1968) ("jurisdictional precondition") with
Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390, 1394 (E.D. Cal. 1968) (timely filing not
an absolute prerequisite in extenuating circumstances).
68. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cart. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978).
69. Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1979); Leake v. University
of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1979).
In MAerthur, the Fifth Circuit had held Evans to be controlling and treated the filing period
as jurisdictional. See text accompanying note 66 supra. Subsequently, in Bickham v. Miller, 584
F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit held that the 30-day deadline, under 5 C.F.R. § 713.214
(1978) and Air Force Regulations, for a military employee to file an administrative complaint was
jurisdictional but that the period could be delayed on equitable grounds. The Bickhan court
relied on Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975), which had
permitted equitable tolling of the EEOC filing period. In holding that the Title VII filing period is
subject to equitable modification, the Chappellcourt relied in part on the Biekham court's retreat
from Merrthur's harsh jurisdictional approach. 601 F.2d at 1300. The Chappell court further
held, however, that equitable tolling was inappropriate on the facts of that case and that the district court's jurisdictional dismissal was proper. Id. at 1304. Although the Chappell court recognized the inconsistency in such a holding, id. at 1298, it held that, while the filing requirement was
subject to equitable modification, untimely filing deprived the court ofjurisdiction. Id. at 1304.
See id. at 1304 (Fay, J., specially concurring).
70. McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 2869 (1979); Wood v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 580 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1978) (dictum).
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Second Circuit has merely concluded that it is an open question. 71 The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has not dealt with
the issue, 72 and other circuit courts that have dealt with the issue have

been vague. 73 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, for example, referred to the time limit as one of the "filing period

requirements."'74 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated that "the time limits for filing a charge and giving

notice to the employer are a Congressionally established statute of limitations. 75 This language from the Ninth Circuit is inconclusive because the case from which it is taken concerned the applicability of the
state statute of limitations, rather than the effect of failure to comply
with the EEOC filing deadline. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit had previ-

ously stated that the right to sue depends on timely compliance,76
which can be interpreted to support either position. Since the Third

Circuit's decision in Hart, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has implied that the filing period may be subject to eq-

uitable modification by its approval of a district court's opinion that
relied in part on equitable considerations.7 7
Resolution of the disagreement whether the filing period is juris71. Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978). Prior to the
decision in Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical Co., 598 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit had
also concluded that the question was open. See Stuppiello v. ITT Avionics Div., 575 F.2d 430,
432 n.4 (3d Cir. 1978).
72. Two district courts within the First Circuit have, however, taken a stand on the issue. See
Tarvesian v. Carr Div. of TRW, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 336, 338-39 (D. Mass. 1976) (reference to filing
period as jurisdictional); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891, 896 (D. Me. 1970)
(timely filing is jurisdictional prerequisite).
73. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R. FED. 833 (1970).
74. Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973, 974 n.2 (10th Cir. 1972).
75. Kirk v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 578 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1004.
76. Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007
(1978).
77. Bledsoe v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1979), ajt'g, 473 F. Supp. 864
(M.D.N.C. 1978) (summary judgment for defendant).
The Fourth Circuit's position on the nature of the filing deadline has been uncertain. In
Phillips v. Columbia Gas of W. Va., Inc., 347 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. W. Va. 1972), affdmem., 474
F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1973), the district court stated that untimely filing deprives the court of jurisdiction. Subsequent district court cases have considered the filing period to be jurisdictional without citing Phills. In Linder v. Litton Systems, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 14 (D. Md. 1978), the court stated
that, based on Alexander, timely filing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, but reserved for trial a
decision on whether the court could consider a discriminatory layoff in addition to a failure to
recall when a charge based on the layoff alone would have been time-barred. Id. at 18. In Garett
v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 25 (M.D.N.C. 1978), the court implied that the filing
period is jurisdictional by its statement, citing Evans, that timely filing is necessary for a complaint
to be actionable. Id. at 44. In Doski v. M. Goldsecker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1329 (4th Cir. 1976),
the court merely stated that a plaintiff must have timely filed with the EEOC before filing suit in
district court. This vague dictum did not specify whether the failure to timely file deprived the
court ofjurisdiction. In Bledsoe, the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
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dictional has not been aided by recourse to the legislative history. In

fact, courts have drawn contrary conclusions from this history.78 This
lack of direction has led the Fifth Circuit to remark that the legislative
history of Title VII is "virtually. .. incomprehensible. '79 Nevertheless, in OccidentalLife Insurance Co. v. EEOC,0 the Supreme Court

found meaning in the legislative history and stated that the history of
the 1972 amendments 8 ' indicates that filing with the EEOC and notice
to the defendant were seen by Congress as "the statute of limitations
problem. 82 According to the Court, Congress' concern for fairness in
Title VII was directed to the filing with the EEOC, as well as to notice
to the defendant.

3

Although the legislative history is inconclusive, the procedural regulations of the EEOC are very helpful. 4 These regulations do not treat
the Title VII limitation period as jurisdictional.8 5 In fact, the EEOC

regulations specifically treat untimely filing as a failure to state a claim
under Title VII, by providing that a charge that is untimely or that

"otherwise fails to state a claim"8' 6 shall be dismissed by the EEOC. 87
Because dismissal by the EEOC does not vitiate a charge, but merely

triggers the running of the ninety-day period to file suit in district
court,88 the EEOC presumably does not consider untimely filing to be
Carolina relied in part on Doski in holding that the filing deadline is jurisdictional, but then held
that equitable criteria could be considered. 473 F. Supp. at 866.
78. Compare In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142,
1151 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. granted,99 S.Ct. 2834 (1979) (legislative history does not indicate filing
period is nonjurisdictional) with Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir,
1976) (legislative history "suggests" time limits are similar to statutes of limitations). Seegenerall
Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, at 845, 846 & n.191; text accompanying note 82 iqfra.
79. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1138 n.7 (5th Cir. 1971).
80. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
81. The 1972 amendments extend the filing period and require that notice of the complaint
be given to the employer within ten days. See note 2 supra.
82. 432 U.S. at 371.
83. Id. The concern for fairness implies that the time period is a statute of limitations because fairness is an equitable consideration and jurisdictional bars are unaffected by equitable
considerations.
84. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.1-.74 (1979). These procedural regulations are distinguishable from
the EEOC guidelines that were given "great deference" in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
85. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (1979). The regulation refers to timeliness as an issue of "sat-

isfying the filing requirements."
86. Id. § 1601.19(a).
87. The regulations provide that "[w]here a charge on its face.
investigation the Commission determines, that the charge.

. .

. . discloses,

or where after

is not timely/fled, or otherwvisefadls

to state a claim under Title VII, the Commission shall dismiss the charge." Id. (emphasis added).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976) permits a civil action to be brought within 90 days after
the EEOC's dismissal of a charge. The EEOC also treats a finding of "no reasonable cause" as a
dismissal under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1979), and the Supreme Court has held that such a finding

1980]

EMPL 0 YMENT DISCRIMINATION

the type of defect that-will prevent a suit from being brought. Courts,
however, have not relied on these procedural regulations for guidance
in interpreting the nature of the Title VII filing requirement.
Because the nature of the Title VII filing requirement is a question
of statutory interpretation, the correctness of the Hart decision must be
evaluated in accordance with established methods of statutory construction, the fundamental principle of which is to effectuate the legislative intent. 89 Only if that intent is unclear from the language of a
statute should a court resort to canons of construction.9" Notwithstanding the unambiguous language of a statute, however, a court may look
to the policy behind a statute when a literal interpretation would require a result that is "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole." 9 ' The language of the Title VII filing requirement is,
therefore, the logical starting point of analysis. If the language is ambiguous, resort may be had to legislative history, administrative interpretation and overall policy.
The language of section 2000e-5(e),9 2 which sets forth the filing
requirements, is ambiguous for two reasons: it imposes a requirement
but is silent on the effect of a failure to comply, 93 and it contains
phraseology that resembles neither a jurisdictional requirement nor a
statute of limitations.94 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit in
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
89. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
90. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 313 (1938).
91. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). Compare United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2726-27 (1979) ("Respondent's reliance upon a literal construction. . . is misplaced. . . .The prohibition against racial discrimination in §§ 703(a) and
(d) of Title VII must therefore be read against the background of the legislative history of Title
VII and the historical context from which the Act arose.") and id. at 2732 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Congress that passed Title VII probably thought it was adopting a principle of nondiscrimination that would apply to blacks and whites alike. . . .[S]etting aside that principle can be
justified where necessary to advance statutory policy ....") with id. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The Court blandly tells us that Congress could not really have meant what it said
.... ") and id. at 2753 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("By going not merely beyond, but directly

againstTitle VII's language and legislative history, the Court has sown the wind.")
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), quoted at note 2 supra.
93. But S( In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1151
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 2834 (1979) ("shall be filed" is clear statutory language;
time limit is jurisdictional).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976) states that "[a] charge. . . shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days." This language can be compared with that of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976),
which is undoubtedly a jurisdictional prerequisite: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000. . .and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States ...." The
Title VII filing period is thus clearly not phrased as a limitation on the power of the court, but
neither is it phrased as a typical statute of limitations. For example, the Federal Employers' Lia-
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Hart95reasoned that, because Title VII's jurisdictional section, section
2000e-5(f)(3), 96 grants federal courts "jurisdiction of actions brought
under [Title VII]," 97 without specifically requiring timely filing, the

filing requirement is not jurisdictional, and section 2000e-5(e) is therefore unambiguous. 98 The phrase "jurisdiction of actions brought under
this subchapter ' 99 may, however, incorporate compliance with the pro-

cedural requirements of the subchapter. This language, therefore, cannot be relied upon as determinative.
Like the language of the statute, the legislative history of Title VII

provides little help in determining the intent of Congress with respect
to the nature of the Title VII filing requirement."

Thus, it is not sur-

prising that the Hart court cited the legislative history only for a stateResort to the policies of the
ment of the broad purpose of Title VII.
statute and administrative interpretation is, therefore, necessary to determine legislative intent.
In determining whether the filing deadline is jurisdictional, the

policy underlying Title VII does not provide any clear indication of
bility Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976), provides for a statute of limitations as follows: "No
action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day
the cause of action accrued." *Therefore, qualitative analysis of Title VII's phraseology does not
indicate whether the time limit is jurisdictional.
95. See note 30 supra.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976) provides that "[e]ach United States district court and
each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter."
97. Id.
98. 598 F.2d at 832. According to this theory, a charge of employment discrimination could
be "brought under this subchapter" regardless of the time of filing. While a court would not have
jurisdiction under Title VII of, for example, an action based on discrimination in housing because
it would not be brought "under this subchapter," a meritless claim of employment discrimination
would be within the jurisdiction of the court, and would require dismissal for failure to state a
claim under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If, as the EEOC regulations indicate, untimely filing is
treated as a failure to state a claim, a dismissal for untimely filing is not a matter of the court's
jurisdiction under Title VII. See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
In contrast, the judicial review section of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976),
makes an administrative hearing and final decision explicit prerequisites of judicial review. See
generally Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, at 847. In construing the provisions of the Social
Security Act, the Supreme Court has held that a final decision after a hearing is "central to the
requisite grant of subject-matter jurisdiction." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975). The
Court later held, however, that this requirement has two components-exhaustion of administrative remedies and presentation of a claim for benefits-of which only the second component is
"purely 'jurisdictional' in the sense that it cannot be 'waived' by the Secretary in a particular
case." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976). This imprecise use of the term "jurisdiction" is a further indication that the Supreme Court uses the term very loosely. See generally text
accompanying notes 139-52 infra.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(3) (1976).
100. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
101. See 598 F.2d at 831-32.
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congressional intent. As pointed out in Hart, the purpose of Title VII
is the elimination of employment discrimination. 2 Although both the
Hart court10 3 and other courts's° have stated that such remedial legis-

lation should be liberally construed,°Sa policy of ending discrimination does not compel a conclusion that time limits are not
jurisdictional. Rather, the imposition of strict jurisdictional limits
might have been the compromise necessary to secure passage of Title
VII, with the result that the time limitations really were intended as
jurisdictional. 6 Title VII's remedial purpose, therefore, tells us little
about the intent of Congress concerning the specific issue of filing
deadlines.
While the Hart court made a superficial inquiry into legislative
intent, it based its decision on policy factors unrelated to a determination of intent. The Hart court based its conclusion, in part, on the undesirable results of treating the deadline as jurisdictional. 0 7 Hard
cases or desired results, however, should not supplant statutory construction in keeping with the legislative intent as the determining factor
in resolving the dispute.'0 8 The Hart court further based its decision
on how courts should "treat" the filing deadline issue in order to carry
out Congress' broader purposes rather than on specific congressional
intent with respect to that issue. The court thus concluded that a remedial scheme based on filing by laymen requires flexibility0 9 and that, in
order to carry out the remedial purposes of Title VII, the time requirements should not be "treated" as jurisdictional." 0 Although this type
of analysis may result in judicial amendment of a statute to carry out a
102. Id.
103. Id. at 831.
104. See, e.g., Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1977); Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1975).
105. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
106. See generally Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972). In Moore, the
court noted:
As a part of a compromise which made it possible to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964, its

sponsors agreed to the inclusion of provisions which impose an extremely short limitations period on private claims and require a resort to state procedures, where available,
as a condition precedent to a private action in the federal courts.
Id. at 820-21.
107. 598 F.2d at 832.
108. The court, however, might simply have concluded that Congress intended to prevent
harsh and inequitable results and therefore established a nonjurisdictional time limit. If that was
the court's conclusion, it merely left out two steps in its analysis by failing to state that Congress
desired to prevent inequitable results and for that reason intended the time limit to be flexible.
109. 598 F.2d at 832; see note 27 and accompanying text supra.
110. 598 F.2d at 832.
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court's view of broader legislative goals, "' there may be no alternative

when, as here, broad purposes are the only indication of Congress' intent. In fact, in Love v. Pullman Co.,' t2 the Supreme Court employed
this type of analysis in the context of the Title VII filing deadline by

permitting a fling procedure that was not technically correct but which
complied with the purpose of the filing deadline." 3 In Love, however,

the Court relied on the specific purpose of the filing deadline"14 in addition to the broad purposes of Title VII as a whole. In contrast, the Hart
court cited Love only for the broad proposition that, because of the
remedial purpose of Title VII, courts should be flexible in reviewing
filing by laymen, and not for the statement in Love concerning the purpose of the filing deadline itself." 5 The Hart court's reliance on the
remedial purpose of Title VII would have been more persuasive, however, had it been accompanied by a discussion of the EEOC's interpretation of section 2000e-5(e) and a qualitative analysis of the filing
deadline.

In construing a statute, the interpretation of the agency responsible
for its execution is very persuasive, and should be followed in the absence of compelling contrary indications." 6 The EEOC interprets failure to make a timely filing under Title VII as a failure to state a claim
rather than a jurisdictional defect."I7 Failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted"

jurisdiction." 9

8

obviously differs from lack of subject matter

Moreover, the EEOC treats its dismissal for untimely

filing as the type of defect that still allows suit to be brought within

ninety days. 2 ° The EEOC's interpretation that the fling deadline is
111. See generaly United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940).
112. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
113. Id. at 526. In Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 928-29 (5th Cir.
1975), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
goal-oriented analysis in Love in concluding that the Title VII filing period is not jurisdictional.
But f McArthur v. Southern Airways, Inc., 569 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (time limit
is jurisdictional).
114. See text accompanying note 132 infra.
115. 598 F.2d at 832.
116. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) ("[T]he construction
of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling
indications that it is wrong ..
"); see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 99 S. Ct. 2066, 2074 (1979)
(EEOC interpretation "entitled to great deference").
117. See notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra; accord, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553, 561 n.1 (1977) (dissenting opinion) (untimely filing treated as a failure to state a
claim). See generally Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, at 847 & n.194.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
120. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
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not jurisdictional should, therefore, be followed because there are no

compelling indications that it is wrong. t2 ' In fact, the EEOC's interpretation coincides exactly with the remedial purposes of Title VII and
with the qualitative nature of the filing deadline.

Neither Hart nor other courts have analyzed the Title VII limitation period qualitatively to determine whether it partakes of the nature
ofjurisdiction or repose. One reason courts may avoid such theoretical

analysis is that discussions of subject matter jurisdiction become almost
metaphysical. For example, the Title VII "jurisdictional" requirements

have been variously described in terms of exhausting administrative
remedies,' 2 2 being affected by discrimination within ninety days of the

filing date, "23
' and establishing jurisdiction by reliance on a discriminatory act followed by timely filing.' 24 Failure to comply with these "jurisdictional" requirements has been compared to bringing suit on an

act of discrimination occurring before Title VII was enacted

25

and to

the extinction of the federal right on which federal jurisdiction was
based. 126
The filing requirement arguably limits the "temporal reach" of the

court and, therefore, is a restriction on its jurisdiction.

27

On the other

hand, the filing period does not share characteristics of requirements

generally considered to be jurisdictional. 2 ' For example, the filing period does not arise from constitutional limitations on federal judicial
power, as does a requirement that there be a case or controversy, 12 9 and
121. See text accompanying notes 158-62 infra.
122. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1971).
123. Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1971).
124. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557 n.9 (1977).
125. See id. at 558.
126. See Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, at 844 n.183. The authors, however, convincingly
demonstrate the weakness of this theory.
127. This concept of "temporal reach" might be what the Supreme Court had in mind in
Evans when it said that
United was entitled to treat that past act as lawful after respondent failed to file a charge
of discrimination within the 90 days then allowed by § 706(d). A discriminatory act
which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory
act which occurred before the statute was passed.
431 U.S. at 558 (1977). The Court might, however, have been implying that the filing period is a

statute of limitations by its reference to the employer's repose.
128. Although FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a) requires a complaint to include "a short and plain state-

ment of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends," the forms provided under FED.
R. Civ. P. 84 do not include any forms for the performance of conditions precedent as a basis of
jurisdiction.
129. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
Although most courts base Title VII jurisdiction on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976), at least
one court based Title VII jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1976), which contains no require-
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does not fundamentally concern the nature of the controversy, as in
federal question jurisdiction, 3 °or the identity of the parties, as in diversity jurisdiction.' 3 ' Moreover, in Love v. Pullman Co., the Supreme
Court analyzed the filing deadline functionally and noted that the purpose of the filing deadline is, "to ensure expedition in the filing and
handling of those complaints." 32 This analysis focuses on the purpose
of the specific provision, rather than on the broad remedial purposes of
the legislation as a whole. Under the functional approach of Love, the
filing period is not jurisdictional because the purpose of the filing period is to "ensure expedition," and it is, therefore, a matter of efficiency
and fairness rather than a restriction on the power of the court.' 3 This
view is supported by the Court's discussion of the filing period in Occidental Life Insurance Co., which emphasized Congress' concern for
fairness, "3 and by the Court's emphasis on notice in Electrical Workers. 1" Because the purpose of the Title VII filing period is to ensure
efficiency and fairness, 36 it resembles a statute of repose rather than a
"door-closing" device.' 3 7 On balance, therefore, the Title VII filing period is not jursidictional from a theoretical perspective. The difficulty
in resolving this issue may lie in the lack of any strict qualitative distinction between jurisdictional requirements and statutes of limitation.
The only difference between the two that can be stated with certainty is
38
that one type of limitation can be modified whereas the other cannot.
In addition to confusion over the nature of subject matter jurisdiction, the Title VII filing deadline has been beset by what one court
referred to as "conceptual confusion."'' 39 Courts have tolled purportment of timely filing. See Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). See generally Guay v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 n. 1 (D. Mass. 1978).
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
131. See id.§ 1332(a).
132. 404 U.S. at 526.
133. In fact, the statement of purpose in Love is immediately followed by the statement that
"respondent makes no showing of prejudice to its interests." Id.
134. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 80-83, 132-35 and accompanying text supra.
137. In contrast, the Act of March 3, 1863, ch. XCII, § 10, 12 Stat. 765, which required claims
cognizable in the Court of Claims to be filed or transmitted within six years after accrual, has been
described as limiting the power of the Court of Claims because the limitation period is a qualification on the waiver of sovereign immunity. See Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 229 (1887).
See also United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48 (1898). Obviously, a court's power to adjudicate
Title VII claims is not restricted by such considerations.
138. See notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text supra.
139. Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1975).
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edly jurisdictional limitations, 4 ' and both courts and commentators

use the terms "prerequisite," "jurisdictional prerequisite," "limitation
period" and "statute of limitations" interchangeably. 4 ' The Court in
Electrical Workers, for example, referred to the deadline for filing a
charge with the EEOC as a "statutory period,"' 4 2 a "limitations pe-

riod,"' 14 3 a "jurisdictional prerequisite"'" and "the time within which
to fie a claim."' 14 5 Although the Court in Electrical Workers used the

phrase "jurisdictional prerequisite," it emphasized the notice function
of the filing deadline, 46 which indicates that it is similar to a statute of
Workers denies courts the power to permit
limitations. Electrical
"slight" delays,'4 7 but "slight" delays can be distinguished from "excusable" delays.' 4 8 Moreover, courts and commentators have seized

upon the failure of Electrical Workers to prohibit tolling entirely as an
indication that the time limit may be subject to equitable modification
in the proper circumstances."' Therefore, Electrical Workers cannot
be considered a definitive holding that the Title VII filing period is

jurisdictional, and its dictum cannot foreclose independent decision by
lower courts.
Likewise, Evans did not foreclose independent decision. Although
the Seventh Circuit cited Evans as referring to the time limit as a
"jurisdictional prerequisite,"' 5 ° the Evans Court merely called it a
140. See id See generally Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir.
1979); Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 641 n.64 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. See Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, at 842 n.167. For example, one commentator
wrote that "[t]he Supreme Court has not decided whether the limitations period of Title VII is to
be construed as an absolute jurisdictional bar or a jurisdictional requirement subject to equitable
modification." Note, Continuing Violationsof Title VI." A SuggestedApproach,63 MINN. L. REv.
119, 122 n.14 (1978).
142. 429 U.S. at 236.
143. Id. at 240.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 241.
146. See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
147. 429 U.S. at 240.
148. Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, states:
What constitutes a "slight" delay because of deferral and what constitutes an "excusable" delay, however, appear to be two different things. The language of Robbins &
Myers [Electrical Workers] indicates that courts may not substitute their judgment for
that of Congress on the length of the period in which discriminatees must file their
claims. But it is by no means clear that Congress has withdrawn from the courts the
discretion to determine whether a delay that causes a title VII plaintiff to miss the filing
deadline is excusable.
Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted).
149. See notes 60 & 61 and accompanying text supra. See also Jackson & Matheson, supra
note 4, at 818.
150. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
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"prerequisite" rather than a "jurisdictional prerequisite." Thus, the Evans Court did not describe the time limit as a "jurisdictional prerequisite," even though it cited Alexander and ElectricalWorkers, which did
refer to it as such. These considerations may not prove the Supreme
Court's intent to abandon the jurisdictional theory, but they do indicate
inadvertent use of language that does not demonstrate a clear intent to
determine the nature of the filing requirement. Evans, which dealt primarily with the continuing violation theory,'-" gave an internally inconsistent treatment to the filing period.' 5 2 In addition, the Fifth
Circuit erroneously interpreted the Evans holding. Evans did not, as
the Fifth Circuit believed, 53 reinstate the district court's jurisdictional
dismissal; it merely held that the complaint was "properly dismissed,"' 54 which might have referred only to the facts of that case.
Moreover, the Court indicated that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
would have been appropriate.' 55 Therefore, Evans is also not controlling on the nature of the filing deadline, and the Third Circuit was
in Stuppiello v. ITTAvion/cs Div.,'5 6 that it was an
correct in holding,
57
open question.'
The Third Circuit was also correct, in Hart, in holding that the
Title VII filing period is not jurisdictional,' 58 but could have given better reasons for its holding, such as the qualitative nature and function
of the filing period. Despite the Supreme Court's apparently inadvertent dictum to the contrary, 59 the Court has emphasized that the purposes of the time limit are notice, fairness and efficiency, which
indicates that it is similar to a statute of limitations.' 60 Moreover, the
EEOC's interpretation is that untimely filing is a failure to state a claim
rather than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 6 ' Finally, the deadline to file a charge with the EEOC is not the type of requirement commonly thought of as jurisdictional and is not analogous to traditional
jurisdictional requirements.' 62 This theoretical analysis and the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

431 U.S. at 557; see note 166 infra.
See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
See text accompanying note 66 supra.
431 U.S. at 557.
See text accompanying note 58 supra.
575 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 432 n.4.
See notes 20-30 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 139-56 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 133-35 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 84-88 & 116-21 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 128-31 and accompanying text supra.
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EEOC's interpretation, neither of which was mentioned in Hart,

strongly reinforce Hart'sreliance on the remedial purpose of Title VII,
which might be insufficient alone to clearly indicate the legislative in-

tent on this specific provision.
There are a number of practical consequences that should result
from the holding of any circuit, such as that of the Third Circuit in

Hart, that the Title VII filing deadline is nonjurisdictional. First, tolling will now be permitted under certain circumstances. 163 Although

the district court in Hart held as a matter of law that plaintiff was not
entitled to equitable modification on the facts of that case,164 a trial will
be required when there are issues of fact concerning a plaintiff's knowl-

edge and a defendant's representations. This may increase both the
volume of litigation and the pressure on a defendant to settle. Moreover, when equitable factors are clearly present on the undisputed facts,
a defense of untimely filing will be stricken. 165 Allowing these cases to

proceed to trial will increase the number of trials, but may simplify
motion practice and appeals by making it unnecessary to allege a continuing violation. 166 Finally, the possibility of trial despite delayed

EEOC filing may require defendants to preserve evidence for a longer
time. Although an employer may argue that tolling would be inequitable and prejudicial in a case in which records have already been destroyed, employers in the circuits that have held the filing deadline

nonjurisdictional are now on notice that suit may be brought on
charges filed more than 300 days from the alleged unlawful act.
163. The Second Circuit has indicated that tolling may be limited to particular circumstances.
Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1978). An extensive list of
tolling criteria can be found in Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4, at 848-50.
164. 598 F.2d at 833.
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
166. See generally Jackson & Matheson, supra note 4. Although courts occasionally confuse
tolling and continuing violations, a continuing violation is not a ground for tolling.
[Iln continuing violation cases it is incorrect to speak of tolling the filing period, at least
after Evans, because for a continuing violation to be actionable, it is necessary that a
present violation exist. If a present violation is alleged, there is no need to expand the
time, through tolling, in which the claim must be filed.
Id. at 841 (footnote omitted).
Tolling should also be distinguished from accrual. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), the
time period begins to run when the unlawful practice occurs. Although tolling is a suspension of
the limitation period, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 473 & n.2 (1975)
(dissenting opinion), one court excused the complainant's noncompliance by delaying the start of
the time period "until the facts. . . were apparent or should have been apparent." Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 1975). Hart also indicated that the
date of discovery might "trigger the running of the limitation period." 598 F.2d at 834. Because
the statute explicitly states when the time period begins to run, equitable modification should
suspend the running rather than delay the commencement of the period. If tolling for equitable
considerations is denied, a Title VII plaintiff has no claim for delayed accrual.
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The Supreme Court could have prevented the excessive litigation
and expense generated by the filing deadline issue by deciding it or
leaving it open until properly presented, rather than creating confusion
through inadvertent dictum in cases such as Evans and ElectricalWorkers. It might have been more advantageous for courts, litigants and the
public to have had an arbitrary, predictable answer rather than no answer at all. However, while the excesses of litigation and expense were
triggered by the High Court's inadvertent use of language, the lower
federal courts must share the blame for imputing unintended meaning
into the Supreme Court's every word. Since the Third Circuit's decision in Hart, there has been a clear trend toward treating the filing
requirement as nonjurisdictional,167 but there is still a split among the
circuits. Although this position may eventually be adopted by all the
circuits, the pendulum might just as easily swing in the opposite direction unless the conflict is definitively resolved by the Supreme Court.
A major impediment to ultimate resolution of the issue may be that
decisions such as Hart, which permit tolling in the abstract but deny
tolling on the facts of the case, are not readily appealable. In such
cases, the defendant does not appeal because he has prevailed and the
plaintiff is bound by an unfavorable determination of fact that he failed
to exercise due diligence. It is to be hoped, however, that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari when a proper case is presented. 168
DEAN MURRAY HARRIS

167. See text accompanying notes 68, 69 & 77 supra.
168. The recent Sixth Circuit decision in Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 605 F.2d 255 (6th
Cir. 1979), may be appropriate for a resolution of this issue because tolling was permitted on the
facts of that case.

